DC police under investigation for manipulating crime stats

 Leadership at the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) under former chief Pamela A. Smith (who announced on Dec. 8 she would step down at year’s end) reportedly “deliberately” suppressed or distorted crime statistics in the nation’s capital “to lower public-facing crime rates,” according to a 22-page interim report from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.  The Committee opened the inquiry on Aug. 25, 2025, after reports suggested that crime statistics were being manipulated downward.

Oversight majority staff conducted eight transcribed interviews with seven “experienced” acting MPD district commanders and one suspended commander.  There are seven geographic policing districts in the District of Columbia, and the district commanders report directly to “the highest levels of the MPD.”  The Committee anonymized interviewees to protect them from retaliation.

District commanders consistently testified that Chief Smith created a “toxic management culture,” resulting in officers suffering “frustration and exhaustion” and a fear of retaliation by Smith.  Commanders feared public humiliation for reporting “bad news” to Smith, particularly about “any rise in public crime statistics.”  As a result, public-facing crime statistics were not reliably reported, according to the report.

 

 

One district commander said that the goal at the end of the year “is to have the lowest crime possible to report out to the mayor and the city.”  He stated that the department manipulated the numbers:

By pressuring her command staff to alter classification for the sole purpose of artificially reducing crime numbers reported out to the public, Chief Smith incentivized the manipulation of crime numbers, which do not adequately account for the crime taking place in D.C.

Aside from the manipulation of the crime numbers, the chief’s behavior also materially affected the morale of current officers and the hiring of new ones.  The district commanders spoke of “retaliatory transfers and demotions” for those who “did not present her with favorable crime statistics or who, in Chief Smith’s judgment, questioned her actions.”  As a result, retention of experienced officers and district commanders became more difficult, and district commanders said adverse conditions during her tenure also hampered training and recruitment.

What did commanders tell the Committee?

The report states that district commanders described leadership priorities as shifting toward reducing the specific crimes that appear in the public “Daily Crime Report (DCR)” — a public-facing dataset limited to nine felony categories — and using classification practices to keep incidents out of those reportable buckets.  The nine felony categories are homicide, sex abuse, assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW), robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft, theft from auto, theft (other), and arson.

Chief Smith required that major incidents be elevated and discussed before they were formally classified in MPD’s system so that the classification and, thus, the statistics, could be influenced upfront.  The report argues that this requirement diverted time from investigations and crime-fighting.

The report also highlights that in recent years, intermediate categories were created for offenses that district commanders said could shift incidents into non-DCR classifications.  For example, leadership pressured officers to move assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW) into “endangerment with a firearm.”  The report notes that endangerment with a firearm is not publicly reported the way ADW is.

Other DCR offenses were also downgraded to non-DCR labels.  “Commander B” below described cases that “read like a burglary” but were classified as “unlawful entry and theft” instead, explicitly noting that “unlawful entry doesn’t hit the DCR status of burglary.”  The report also states that district commanders said intermediate offenses (e.g., “felony assault”) are not in the DCR and could make reported ADWs drop even if violence does not.

PIC

The environment was also chaotic and unpredictable, according to the district commanders, resulting in transfers and, in one case, early retirement of “a guy who had a stellar career.”

Chief Smith not only moved and demoted officials, but she also created an atmosphere of unpredictability. One commander spoke to the capriciousness of Chief Smith’s personnel practices and that she even declared it would be better for commanders to “make something up” than not have an answer.

The crime briefing system during Smith’s tenure changed significantly from that of the former chief of police, Robert J. Contee Ⅲ.  One district commander explained that Contee used the weekly meetings as “a way to assess crime with his executive team and kind of have a group think.”  Chief Smith, however, insisted upon daily updates while “degrad[ing] communication, collaboration, and morale.”  Moreover, outside the crime briefings, Smith had a “closed-door policy” and did not speak directly with district commanders.

Other police departments manipulate crime stats, too

MPD is not the only police department to have documented instances of downgrading or misclassification of crimes.

• In 2013, the New York Police Department (NYPD)’s 81st Precinct faced allegations that victims were discouraged from filing reports or that reports were not properly filed, among other issues.  An internal review “confirmed manipulation of crime stats.”
• In 2014, the Office of the Inspector General of the City of New Orleans audited the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) on its reporting of forcible rape and reported that 46% of tested offenses were misclassified as sexual battery, miscellaneous, or unfounded.  Miscellaneous misclassifications were not captured in UCR reporting.
• A 2012 Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) crime data audit reported 5,307 under-reported incidents during a targeted audit with aggravated assaults being coded downward.
• Also in 2012, according to local reporting, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) found a measurable error rate in classifying assaults.  Again, such misreporting affects UCR reporting.

Why manipulate crime stats?

Police departments sometimes massage crime statistics to control the public narrative and reduce reputational damage.  Reported crime trends in big-city policing can trigger investigations, demands for changes in leadership, budget cuts, and unwanted external interventions.  Leadership may believe that better numbers help with recruiting, retention, and public cooperation.  However, in this case, district commanders described the opposite effect.

When promotions or leadership standing are tied to week-to-week numbers, commanders and supervisors may feel strong pressure to show a decline in crime stats, creating incentives to downgrade or suppress reporting.

Local crime stats are used to track and report crime data nationwide, so accuracy is important.  The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program is the FBI’s long-running national system for collecting police-reported crime statistics using standardized definitions and counting rules so crime data can be compared across agencies and over time.  Under UCR, Part1 (Index) offenses are the ones most used for trendlines.  Agencies can reduce reported totals by steering incidents into non-index categories or dispositions.

https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2025/12/dc_police_under_investigation_for_manipulating_crime_stats.html